energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there.
This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made
that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures
taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would
not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders
are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one
is not at hand, they heard of only when they are one can no longer
remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your
officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince;
thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing
to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state from the
outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides
there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
which may be as keys to that state, for it necessary either to do this
or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince
does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can
send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the
citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new
inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered,
are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily
kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it
should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In
conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more
faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being
poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men
ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge
themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;
therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a
kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
more, having to consume on the garrison all income from the state, so
that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated,
because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison
up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile,
and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet
able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless
as a colony is useful.
Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his powerful neighbours,
and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no
foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing
there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by
those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through
fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by
the Aetolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing
they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs
is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the
subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel
against the ruling power. So that in respect to these subject states he
has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole
of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has
only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too
much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill,
he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain
entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this
business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it
he will have endless difficulties and troubles.
The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with the
minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the
greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and
Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was
humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor
did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them
agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the
Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, who
have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for
which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is
easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine
is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it
happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that
in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to
detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or
treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to
cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise
have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they
can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen,
they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them.
there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles,
dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them
come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only
put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with
Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they
could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever